Breaking down the question

The question is analytical and pointed: not is the Davis–Moore theory correct, but why is it called a functional theory. The task is to expose the functionalist logic embedded in their account of stratification — the assumptions, the mode of explanation and the conclusions that mark it out as a specimen of structural functionalism.

To answer well you must first know what makes any explanation functional: it accounts for a social arrangement by the needs it meets for the wider system, treating the arrangement as contributing to the maintenance and survival of society. The demand, then, is to show how Davis and Moore explain stratification in exactly this way — as a mechanism that meets a functional prerequisite of every society.

A strong answer is built around several reasons, each a facet of the functionalist character of the theory:

  • It rests on the premise of functional necessity — stratification exists because society needs it.
  • It explains inequality by its consequences for the system — motivation and role allocation.
  • It shares the core assumptions of functionalism — universality, integration, consensus and system maintenance.
  • It bears the intellectual lineage of Parsonian functionalism.

For the comparative frame of stratification theories, see the note on theories of social stratification.

How to approach it

Open by defining the functionalist mode of explanation, so the reader knows the yardstick against which the theory is being measured. State plainly that functionalism explains institutions by the needs they satisfy for the social whole. This makes every subsequent reason a demonstration that Davis and Moore reason in precisely this fashion.

Then set out the Davis–Moore thesis of 1945 in its own terms — the functional necessity of stratification, the unequal functional importance of positions, the scarcity of talent, the burden of training, and the role of differential rewards in motivating the ablest to fill the most demanding roles. As you expound it, keep flagging the functionalist signature: society as a system with needs, inequality as a solution to a system problem.

Devote the core of the answer to the reasons proper — universality, the appeal to functional prerequisites, the consequence-based explanation, the consensus over values that grades positions, and the affinity with Parsons. Reserve a measured paragraph for Tumin's critique, but frame it as evidence of the theory's functionalist character rather than as the main event, since the question asks why it is functional, not whether it is valid.

Model answer

A functional explanation in sociology accounts for a social institution by the contribution it makes to the functioning of the wider system — by the needs it satisfies for society's maintenance and survival. Kingsley Davis and Wilbert Moore, in Some Principles of Stratification (1945), explain social stratification in exactly this manner, and it is this that earns their theory the name functional.

Their thesis runs as follows. Every society faces the problem of placing individuals in the various positions its social structure requires and of motivating them to perform the associated duties. Positions differ in their functional importance to society and in the talent and training they demand; the most important roles are often the most demanding and the scarcest in qualified personnel. To ensure that these positions are conscientiously filled by the ablest, society attaches to them differential rewards — income, prestige and power. Social stratification, the unequal distribution of rewards across positions, is therefore the mechanism by which a society motivates its members to occupy and perform its most vital roles. Inequality, on this view, is not an accident or an injustice but a functional necessity.

Several reasons, taken together, justify calling this a functional theory.

First, it rests on the premise of functional necessity. Davis and Moore hold that stratification is universal — found in every known society — and infer from that universality that it must serve an indispensable function. The move from universality to necessity is a hallmark of functionalist reasoning, which treats persistent institutions as answers to enduring system needs.

Second, it explains stratification by its consequences for the system, not by the intentions of individuals or the interests of a class. The explanandum — inequality — is accounted for by the beneficial effect it produces: the efficient allocation of roles and the motivation of the talented. This consequence-oriented, need-satisfying form of explanation is the defining structure of functional analysis.

Third, it invokes a functional prerequisite. Just as Parsons identified role allocation and motivation as problems every social system must solve, Davis and Moore present stratification as society's solution to precisely these problems. The theory is thus embedded in the broader functionalist model of society as a system with survival requirements.

Fourth, it presupposes value consensus. The judgement that some positions are more functionally important, and hence deserve greater reward, assumes a shared value system by which a society ranks its roles. This reliance on consensus rather than coercion aligns the theory squarely with the functionalist rather than the conflict tradition, in which order rests on domination.

Fifth, it carries a clear intellectual lineage. The theory is an application of Talcott Parsons's systemic functionalism to the problem of inequality; its vocabulary of system needs, integration and the positive functions of institutions is unmistakably Parsonian.

Sixth, the very critiques it provoked confirm its functionalist identity. Melvin Tumin (1953) attacked it precisely as a functionalist argument — questioning how one measures the functional importance of a position, showing that stratification is often dysfunctional in wasting talent and entrenching privilege, and arguing that it breeds hostility rather than integration. That the standard rebuttals target its assumptions of functional necessity, importance and integration demonstrates that these functionalist claims are indeed the theory's load-bearing walls.

In sum, Davis and Moore explain stratification by the needs it meets for the social system, treat it as universal and necessary, ground it in value consensus, and locate it within the Parsonian model of society as a self-maintaining whole. On every count the explanation is functionalist in form. Whether the theory is true is a separate question — the conflict critics think not — but the reasons for calling it a functional theory lie in its structure of explanation, and these are decisive.

Examiner's perspective

The examiner is checking a subtle competence: whether the candidate can distinguish the form of a theory from its validity. The commonest error is to treat the question as an invitation to attack or defend Davis and Moore, and so to spend the answer on the Tumin critique. The question asks why it is called functional, and the bulk of the marks lie in exhibiting its functionalist logic — necessity, consequence-based explanation, functional prerequisites and consensus.

Precision of exposition matters. Strong scripts state the thesis accurately, using the twin ideas of functional importance and differential rewards, and connect them explicitly to the problems of role allocation and motivation. Weaker scripts paraphrase the theory loosely and never name the features that make it functionalist.

The best answers deploy Tumin in the service of the question — showing that the critiques bite on functionalist assumptions and thereby confirm the theory's character — rather than letting the critique take over. A closing line that separates the theory's functionalist form from the contested question of its truth signals exactly the analytical control the examiner rewards.