Breaking down the question

The statement asserts a causal link — rising ethnocentrism is producing conflict. The directive word is assess, which asks you to evaluate the validity of the claim rather than accept it wholesale. Your answer must weigh how far ethnocentrism explains contemporary social conflict, and where the explanation falls short.

Ethnocentrism, a term coined by William Graham Sumner, is the tendency to judge other cultures by the standards of one's own group, treating the in group as superior and the out group as inferior or threatening. The question links this attitude to conflict in our society — in the Indian context this spans communal, linguistic, regional, tribal and caste based tensions.

The word rising is a claim about a trend, and you should interrogate it. Is ethnocentrism genuinely increasing, or is it being mobilised and amplified by political and economic forces? A good assessment separates ethnocentrism as a psychological attitude from conflict as a social outcome, and asks what mediates between the two.

How to approach it

Begin by defining ethnocentrism precisely and distinguishing it from related ideas such as ethnic identity, communalism and xenophobia. Establish that ethnocentrism is near universal as an attitude, so its mere presence cannot explain conflict — what needs explaining is when and why it turns violent. This connects to the wider study of ethnic conflicts, communalism and revivalism.

In the body, assess the statement from two directions. Affirm that ethnocentric consciousness — sons of the soil movements, religious majoritarianism, linguistic chauvinism and anti migrant sentiment — has indeed sharpened, contributing to visible conflict. Then qualify the claim by showing that ethnocentrism is rarely the root cause. Paul Brass argues that ethnic conflict is instrumentally produced by elites who mobilise identity for power. Relative deprivation, competition over scarce resources and jobs, and political manipulation convert latent difference into active hostility.

Bring in Dipankar Gupta's insight that identity assertions are often about dignity and recognition rather than primordial hatred. Use concrete illustrations — the anti outsider agitations in Assam and Mumbai, communal polarisation and linguistic movements — to ground the analysis. Conclude with a balanced verdict and a note on constitutional and civic remedies.

Model answer

Ethnocentrism, as William Graham Sumner defined it, is the disposition to place one's own group at the centre of the moral universe and to view others through its lens as inferior or menacing. It rests on a sharp in group and out group boundary, generating loyalty inward and suspicion outward. The question asks whether the rise of such consciousness explains the conflicts visible in Indian society. The statement carries considerable truth, but it demands careful qualification.

There is prima facie evidence for the claim. India has witnessed intensified assertions of exclusive identity — religious majoritarianism, sons of the soil movements demanding jobs and land for locals, linguistic chauvinism, and hostility towards migrants and minorities. The Shiv Sena's campaigns against South Indians and later North Indians in Mumbai, the anti foreigner agitation in Assam, and recurrent communal polarisation all display an ethnocentric core — the belief that the out group threatens the rightful primacy of the in group. To this extent, rising ethnocentrism does correlate with rising conflict.

Yet a rigorous assessment must resist treating ethnocentrism as a self sufficient cause. Ethnocentrism as an attitude is nearly universal and long standing — it cannot by itself explain why conflict erupts in particular places and moments. The sociological task is to identify what activates it. Here Paul Brass's instrumentalist argument is decisive — ethnic and communal conflict is not the spontaneous eruption of ancient hatreds but is manufactured by political elites who mobilise identity to capture power and resources. Riots, in this reading, have an organised production, with institutionalised networks that convert everyday difference into episodic violence.

Economic and structural factors mediate the link. The theory of relative deprivation suggests that groups feel aggrieved when their expectations outpace their attainments, especially when a rival group appears to advance at their expense. Competition over scarce jobs, land and government benefits gives ethnocentric rhetoric its traction — the outsider becomes the explanation for local unemployment. Thus ethnocentrism is often the language in which material grievance is expressed, not the underlying cause.

Dipankar Gupta adds a further nuance. Many identity assertions are struggles for dignity and recognition rather than expressions of primordial contempt. Marginalised communities mobilise ethnic or religious identity to claim a place in the political order. What looks like rising ethnocentrism may be the democratic assertion of previously silenced groups — a normal, even healthy, feature of a plural democracy that becomes dangerous only when elites weaponise it.

The role of new technology sharpens the picture. Social media accelerates the circulation of rumour, stereotype and hate, compressing the distance between ethnocentric sentiment and mob action. This amplification helps explain why conflict may appear to be rising even if underlying attitudes have not changed dramatically — the mobilisation has become faster and more far reaching.

An honest assessment therefore reaches a layered verdict. Rising ethnocentrism is a real and contributing factor in contemporary conflict, but it is a proximate and mobilised force rather than an autonomous cause. Behind it lie political entrepreneurs, economic competition, relative deprivation and institutional failures of governance and justice. Where the state ensures fair distribution, impartial policing and swift justice, ethnocentric sentiment rarely escalates. Where it fails, latent difference is easily inflamed.

The remedies follow from this diagnosis. The constitutional framework of secularism, equal citizenship and protection of minority rights provides the normative anchor. Beyond law, sustained inter group contact, inclusive development that reduces competitive grievance, responsible political and media conduct, and a robust civil society that builds cross cutting ties all reduce the flammability of identity. Ethnocentrism cannot be abolished, but its translation into conflict can be blocked.

In conclusion, the statement is broadly valid but incomplete. Ethnocentrism is best understood not as the cause of conflict but as its idiom — the vocabulary through which deeper political and material struggles are fought. Recognising this shifts the response from merely condemning attitudes to addressing the structures and actors that convert difference into violence, which is the true challenge of social transformation.

Examiner's perspective

The examiner watches for candidates who move beyond restating the statement to genuinely assessing it. The strongest answers concede the surface truth — ethnocentric assertion is visible and rising — while demonstrating that attitude alone does not produce conflict. Introducing the mediating variables of elite mobilisation, relative deprivation and economic competition signals analytical maturity.

Credit is earned by pairing theory with named scholars and apt Indian illustrations — Sumner for the concept, Brass for instrumentalism, Gupta for the dignity dimension. Candidates who cite the Assam agitation or the sons of the soil movements without theorising them score less than those who use such cases to test the causal claim.

Common weaknesses include conflating ethnocentrism with communalism, treating the rise as self evident, or slipping into moral condemnation without sociological explanation. A balanced conclusion that reframes ethnocentrism as the idiom rather than the cause of conflict, and links remedies to constitutional and civic mechanisms, marks out a first rate response.