Breaking down the question
The question is evaluative — "how far" — and requires a balanced judgement rather than a one-sided account. It asks you to assess the extent to which untouchables actually trusted Gandhi, which means weighing his undeniable services against the reservations and outright opposition of many Dalits, above all B. R. Ambedkar.
A 10-mark answer must present both sides and reach a reasoned conclusion. The pivot of the discussion is the clash over separate electorates and the Poona Pact of 1932.
How to approach it
Open by acknowledging Gandhi's genuine commitment to abolishing untouchability — his coinage "Harijan", the temple-entry campaigns and the moral centrality he gave the issue. This explains why a section of untouchables did trust him.
Then present the countercurrent: the critique that his approach was paternalistic and reformist rather than emancipatory, culminating in the Ambedkar-Gandhi conflict over political representation. Conclude with a measured verdict. Our note on backward classes and Dalit movements supplies the background.
Model answer
Gandhi's relationship with the untouchables was one of both trust and deep distrust, and the honest answer is that his standing among them was genuine but partial and contested. Many untouchables, especially those drawn to the Congress-led national movement, revered him; a significant and articulate section, led by Ambedkar, did not.
On one side, Gandhi made the abolition of untouchability a central plank of his moral and political programme. He renamed untouchables "Harijans", children of God, campaigned for their entry into temples, wells and schools, undertook fasts against the practice, and insisted that swaraj would be meaningless while untouchability persisted. To ordinary untouchables who joined the freedom struggle, this advocacy from the most revered leader of the age won real affection and trust.
On the other side stood a powerful critique that his concern, however sincere, was paternalistic and inadequate. Gandhi sought to reform caste from within, retaining varna while purging it of untouchability and hierarchy of degradation. Ambedkar and many educated Dalits found this unacceptable: they wanted the annihilation of caste itself and, crucially, political power in Dalit hands rather than benevolent upliftment by caste Hindus.
This distrust crystallised in 1932. When the Communal Award granted untouchables separate electorates, Ambedkar welcomed it as the guarantee of independent Dalit representation. Gandhi opposed it fiercely, fearing it would divide Hindu society, and undertook a fast unto death. The resulting Poona Pact replaced separate electorates with reserved seats within the general electorate. For Ambedkar and his followers this was a defeat extracted under moral coercion, and it hardened the conviction that Gandhi, whatever his intentions, would not concede genuine self-representation. The name "Harijan" itself was later rejected by many Dalits as condescending.
The balanced verdict, then, is that Gandhi was trusted by a large body of untouchables as a compassionate champion, but was profoundly distrusted by the emerging Dalit leadership who saw his reformism as a barrier to real emancipation. His impact was real, but so were the limits of the trust he commanded.
Examiner's perspective
The examiner rewards balance. Because the question asks "how far", a script that only praises Gandhi's Harijan work, or only echoes Ambedkar's critique, cannot reach the top band. The strongest answers hold both together and arrive at a qualified judgement.
The decisive content is the 1932 conflict — the Communal Award, Gandhi's fast and the Poona Pact — handled accurately. Noting the later rejection of the term "Harijan" adds nuance. A clear two-sided structure, firm conclusion and British spelling secure the higher marks.