Breaking down the question
The distinction between the sacred and the profane is the cornerstone of Emile Durkheim's sociology of religion, set out in The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. This short note asks for an exposition of the dichotomy, its role in Durkheim's definition of religion, and the sociological argument that flows from it — namely that the sacred is ultimately society itself, worshipped in disguised form.
For Durkheim, all known religious beliefs classify the world into two mutually exclusive domains: the sacred, set apart, forbidden and treated with awe, and the profane, the ordinary, everyday and mundane. Religion is defined not by belief in gods or the supernatural — many religions lack these — but by this radical separation and the practices that surround the sacred.
The examiner wants both the definition and the deeper thesis about religion's social origin. Our note on sociological theories of religion places Durkheim alongside Weber and Marx.
How to approach it
Begin by defining the sacred and the profane as Durkheim's two mutually exclusive categories, stressing that the difference is one of kind, not degree, and that the boundary is maintained by prohibitions and rituals.
Then build to Durkheim's central claim, drawn from his study of Australian totemism, that the sacred is a symbolic representation of society itself, and that in worshipping the sacred the group is in effect worshipping its own collective power. Bring in collective effervescence to explain how the sense of the sacred is generated.
Conclude with a brief evaluation, noting the theory's insight into the social function of religion and the standard criticisms — over-reliance on Australian data and the blurring of the sacred-profane line in modern life. Attribute the argument to Emile Durkheim.
Model answer
The distinction between the sacred and the profane lies at the heart of Emile Durkheim's sociology of religion, developed in The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. Durkheim argued that although religions differ enormously in their beliefs and rites, they share one universal feature: they divide the whole of the world, things and persons alike, into two mutually exclusive classes. The profane is the domain of the ordinary and the everyday — the routine world of work, utility and individual concern. The sacred is that which is set apart and forbidden, surrounded by prohibitions and approached only through prescribed ritual, and it evokes attitudes of awe, respect and reverence. The gulf between the two is absolute; a thing passes from one to the other only through elaborate rites, and the profane may not touch the sacred without profaning it.
On this basis Durkheim redefined religion itself. He rejected definitions resting on belief in gods or the supernatural, pointing out that some religions, such as certain forms of Buddhism, dispense with deities altogether. Religion, he proposed, is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, beliefs and practices which unite their adherents into a single moral community called a church. What makes something religious is thus its relation to the sacred and its collective, communal character, not its object.
Durkheim then asked what the sacred really is. Studying accounts of Australian aboriginal totemism, which he took to be the most elementary religion, he observed that the totem — a plant or animal treated as sacred emblem of the clan — was simultaneously the symbol of the god and the symbol of the clan itself. From this he drew his famous inference: if the totem stands at once for the divine and for the group, then the god and the group must be one and the same. The sacred is society itself, represented to its members in symbolic form. In worshipping the sacred, the community is unknowingly worshipping its own collective power, the force that constrains and sustains each individual.
The mechanism by which the sense of the sacred is generated is collective effervescence. When the dispersed members of a group gather for ritual, the heightened emotional intensity of the assembly lifts individuals above their ordinary selves and produces a feeling of a power greater than themselves. This power is real — it is the moral authority of society — but it is experienced as the sacred and projected onto totems, gods or symbols. Ritual then periodically renews this collective sentiment, reaffirming the shared beliefs and strengthening the bonds that hold the community together. Religion, on this view, is fundamentally a celebration of the social bond, and its latent function is the maintenance of social solidarity.
Durkheim's theory is illuminating but has attracted criticism. His reliance on secondary accounts of Australian totemism has been questioned, and his generalisation from this single case to all religion is contested. Critics also note that the sacred-profane boundary, so sharp in his account, is blurred in modern secular life, and that his functionalism neglects religion's capacity to divide as well as to unite. Even so, the sacred-profane distinction remains a foundational contribution, capturing the essentially social character of religious experience.
Examiner's perspective
Examiners expect the dichotomy to be defined precisely — mutually exclusive categories separated by kind rather than degree — and then linked to Durkheim's definition of religion as a communal system of beliefs relative to sacred things. Stopping at the definition, without the deeper thesis, limits the marks.
The distinguishing move is to reach Durkheim's claim that the sacred is society itself, supported by the totemism argument and the mechanism of collective effervescence. A crisp critical close — the Australian data, the blurred modern boundary, the functionalist bias — completes a strong twelve-mark note.